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Abstract:  
We show that the standard trust question routinely used in social capital research is 
importantly related to cooperation behavior and we provide a microfoundation for this 
relation. We run a large-scale public goods experiment over the internet in Denmark and find 
that the trust question is a proxy for cooperation preferences rather than beliefs about others’ 
cooperation. To disentangle the preference and belief channels, we run a (standard) public 
goods game in which beliefs matter for cooperation choices and one (using the strategy 
method) in which they do not matter. We show that the “fairness question”, a recently 
proposed alternative to the “trust question”, is also related to cooperation behavior but 
operates through beliefs rather than preferences.  
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1.  Introduction 
Trust has been proposed as an important determinant of various economic phenomena, 
including growth (Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001), financial development 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004), and civic participation (La Porta et al. 1997). Such 
studies suggest that survey measures of trust like the standard trust question (“Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”) is a good proxy for “social capital” and that social capital promotes 
economic efficiency by facilitating cooperation and the enforcement of incomplete contracts. 
However, this literature has been challenged on the grounds that it is unclear what survey 
measures such as the trust question actually measure (see e.g. Sobel 2002, Durlauf 2002, 
Beugelsdijk 2006). To address this critique, a growing literature combines survey measures 
and experimental data to shed light on the microfoundations of social capital.  
This paper reports results from a large-scale experiment on cooperation in public goods 
games and relates cooperation behavior to survey measures of social capital, in particular the 
standard trust question. The experiment is run over the internet with more than 1000 randomly 
selected participants from the Danish population. We find that both self-reported trust and 
observed cooperation levels are high, and regression analysis shows that trust attitudes have a 
significant explanatory power for cooperation behavior. While these results are interesting per 
se, the main focus of this paper is to provide a microfoundation for why this relation exists. 
We argue that cooperation choices are driven by preferences and beliefs. Some people have 
no preference for cooperation (14 percent are free riders in our sample), but most have a 
preference for cooperating given that others do (70 percent are conditional cooperators). 
Beliefs about other peoples’ inclination to cooperate do not matter for free riders but do 
matter for conditional cooperators.  
Our main finding is that trust attitudes are a proxy for cooperation preferences but not for 
beliefs. In particular, we show that responses to the standard trust question (Trust for short) 
explain in a statistical sense if a person is a conditional cooperator but not how optimistic 
conditional cooperators are about other peoples’ tendency to cooperate. We also show that the 
fairness question (“Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?”), an alternative to the trust question that has recently 
been added to the World Values Survey, is a proxy for beliefs but not for preferences. In 
particular, we show that responses to the fairness question (Fairness for short) explain in a 
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statistical sense how optimistic conditional cooperators are but responses do not explain if a 
person is a conditional cooperator. We speculate that the two survey measures capture 
different aspects of social capital because Trust evokes thoughts about what the respondent 
generally does (“you can’t be too careful”) while Fairness evokes thoughts about how other 
people generally behave (“would they try to be fair?”). The finding that alternative survey 
measures capture different aspects of social capital has important implications for 
measurement of social capital and for policy. For example, cooperation preferences are likely 
to be more stable and more difficult to influence than beliefs about cooperativeness in society. 
Thus, to reduce tax evasion, traffic rule violations or bribery, it may be easier to correct 
pessimistic beliefs about other peoples’ compliance with cooperation norms than attempting 
to shape deep preferences for honesty and compliance in the population. 
Our paper contributes in several ways to a recent stream of research combining survey and 
experimental measures of social capital. First, we relate Trust to cooperation behavior while 
the literature has focused almost exclusively on behavior in experimental trust games (notable 
exceptions are Ahn et al. 2003, Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni 2004). This focus on trust 
experiments in the literature is surprising given that “social capital” is a multifaceted concept 
(Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999), and that most definitions of social capital involve notions of 
trust and cooperation. In fact, many contributors to the economics literature see trust and 
cooperation as intimately related concepts (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 1997). 
In social psychology, the notions of trust and cooperation have long been thought to be 
closely related. For example, Yamagishi (1986: 111) argues that “mutual trust is the key to 
actual cooperation”. The public goods game used in this study is played in groups and may 
therefore better reflect important aspects of everyday cooperation problems which are often 
multilateral rather than bilateral as in the experimental trust game.1
Second, we provide strong evidence that survey measures of social capital are significant 
predictors of cooperation behavior in the Danish population. The literature finds rather mixed 
results when relating survey and experimental measures of social capital. For example, 
Glaeser et al. (2000) find that Trust has no predictive power for trust as measured in the trust 
game but it predicts trustworthiness in a sample of students at Harvard University. In contrast, 
Fehr et al. (2003) find a relation of survey-measured trust to experimentally measured trust 
 
                                                 
1  An additional concern with using trust games is that first-mover choices in the trust game may not only 
reflect genuine trust but may also be affected by risk attitudes (Karlan 2005), altruism and reciprocity (Cox 
2004), and betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al. 2008). 
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but not to trustworthiness in a representative German sample. Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales 
(2007) find that survey trust predicts trust in a sample of MBA students at the University of 
Chicago. Yet, Bellemare and Kröger (2007) do not find a significant relation either to trust or 
trustworthiness in a Dutch sample. When relating survey trust to cooperation behavior, results 
are equally mixed. For example, an early study by Yamagishi (1986) finds that “high-trustors” 
contribute more than “low-trustors” in a sample of Japanese  subjects, while Ahn et al. (2003) 
find no relation between a survey measure of trust and cooperation behavior in a sample of 
US students. Gächter et al. (2004) find that Fairness is related to cooperation behavior in a 
sample from Russia and Belarus. While these studies are difficult to compare due to numerous 
differences in protocol, subject pool and sample size, the mixed results may well be due to 
cultural differences. For example, Holm and Danielsson (2005) find that survey measures of 
trust predict trust in an experiment in Sweden but not, using the same protocol, in Tanzania. 
Third, our sample of 1070 subjects is unusually large and includes people from all walks 
of life in Denmark. Laboratory studies often use convenience samples of students which tend 
to be rather homogenous and do therefore not allow the researcher to capture heterogeneity in 
behavior and its relation to socio-economics and attitudes.  This is possible in large-scale 
studies with heterogenous samples, and our sample is ideally suited for this purpose as, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the largest experimental sample of its kind.2
Fourth, we implement an “artefactual field experiment” (Harrison and List 2004) by 
running our experiment and survey over the internet rather than in face-to-face interaction (as 
is the case, for example, in the World Values Survey, Glaeser et al. 2000 or Fehr et al. 2003). 
Using the internet allows participants to make choices and give responses in their habitual 
environment (e.g. at home
 An important 
advantage of a large and heterogeneous sample for our purposes is that beliefs and actions are 
less likely to be correlated due to “extrapolation” of one’s own behavior to others. Sapienza et 
al. (2007) argue that this is more likely to happen in relatively homogenous samples such as 
students from Harvard or Chicago. 
3
                                                 
2  Other large-scale studies are, for example, Fehr et al. (2003) with n = 429, Bellemare and Kröger (2007) with 
n = 499, Sapienza et al. (2007) with n = 508, and Gächter et al. (2004) with n = 782 participants. 
) which may reduce the perceived artificiality of the situation 
while maintaining a high level of experimental control. Using the internet also guarantees 
perfect anonymity between subjects. The perfect anonymity and the one-shot nature of our 
3  Denmark has the highest broadband penetration in the world (source: EU Commission’s Progress report on 
the single European electronic communications market 2007,13th report), and daily usage of the internet, e.g. 
for internet banking, is very common.  
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experiment are particularly apt to capture what is sometimes called “thin” trust (i.e. trust 
towards a “generalized other” in contrast to “thick” trust in repeated interaction within a 
social network, see e.g. Putnam 2001: 136). The closest match to our study in this respect is 
Bellemare and Kröger (2007) who use the Dutch Center Panel which is run over computer or 
TV with a set-up box and people make choices in the habitual environments. 
Fifth, we show that different survey measures of social capital capture different 
determinants of cooperation and, thus, of social capital. More specifically, we show that Trust 
is related to cooperation preferences but not to beliefs about cooperation, while it is the other 
way around for Fairness. We are able to disentangle these two channels because we measure 
individual choices, beliefs and preferences along with attitudes.4 We run cooperation games 
in which beliefs do matter (the Standard game) and do not matter (the Strategy game). In the 
Standard game, participants are endowed with money, approximately $10. Participants are 
anonymously matched into groups of 4 and simultaneously decide how much to contribute to 
a common project. All contributions are doubled and equally shared among the 4 participants. 
Not to contribute is therefore the individually money-maximizing choice, while contributing 
the total amount is the efficient choice since each dollar contributed increases total group 
earnings by $2. Participants also indicate their expectation about the average contribution of 
others. In the Strategy game (developed by Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001), participants 
provide a complete contribution schedule conditional on the contribution choices of others. 
That is, they decide to contribute a, b, c given that others on average contribute x, y, z. Thus, 
beliefs about choices of others do not matter for contributions in the Strategy game by design. 
Other large-scale studies have not been able to distinguish between the preference and belief 
channels of cooperation. The closest match to our study in this respect is Sapienza et al. 
(2007). In contrast to our results, these authors find that Trust captures the belief-based 
component but not the preference-based component of behavior in trust games.5
                                                 
4  The need to disentangle the causal channels, but also the difficulties in doing so have been recognized by 
many contributors to the literature. For example, Putnam (2001: 137) notes that “The causal arrows among 
civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti. Only 
careful, even experimental, research will be able to sort them apart definitively.” 
 However, 
our finding is broadly in line with Gächter et al. (2004) who show that Fairness is related to 
cooperation behavior, and with Fehr et al. (2003) who find that the trust question remains 
5  However, the studies are not directly comparable because of differences in experimental protocol (they use 
a trust game) and subject pool (they use a relatively homogenous student sample). In addition, their 
regression analysis does not include Fairness, which makes it hard to compare the results. Comparing the 
results by Sapienza et al. (2007) to our results is also difficult because they use in many specifications a 
measure for unconditional cooperation as a control, which is exactly what Trust measures according to our 
results. 
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significant for explaining trust behavior even when controlling for beliefs about the money 
sent back by second movers (i.e. beliefs about others’ trustworthiness). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the relevant parts 
of our experimental design and procedures. Section 3 reports results. We first show that our 
survey measures of social capital are significantly related to socio-economic variables such as 
age, income, education and gender. Second, we relate Trust and Fairness to beliefs and 
behavior in the Standard game. We show that contributions in the Standard game are 
positively related to beliefs and that both Trust and Fairness explain contributions, controlling 
for socio-economics. However, only Trust is found to be directly related to contributions 
while Fairness is indirectly related to contributions through beliefs. Third, in the Strategy 
game, we find that most participants are conditional cooperators, while only few are free 
riders. The incidence and strength of conditional cooperation is explained by Trust to some 
extent but not by Fairness or socio-economic variables. Section 4 summarizes and discusses 
our results, including a demonstration that Trust is more stable over time than Fairness in 
recent waves of the World Values survey. This finding supports our interpretation that Trust 
measures relatively stable preferences rather than more fickle beliefs.  
 
2.  Design and Procedures 
The data reported in this paper6
The first public goods game (the Standard game) serves to elicit cooperation choices and 
beliefs. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 4 and endowed with 50 Danish Kroner 
(Dkr.), worth about $10. They could contribute an integer number of Dkr. between 0 and 50 
to a public good. The total amount contributed in a group was doubled and shared equally 
among group members. That is, for each Dkr. a player contributed to the public good he or 
she earned half a Dkr. while the group as a whole earned Dkr. 2, creating a conflict between 
individual and collective rationality. After they had made their contribution choices, we 
 comes from 2 main parts. In the experimental part, 
participants play 2 public goods games in sequence without feedback. In the survey part, 
participants respond to 2 survey questions supposed to measure social capital, and report 
socio-economic data.  
                                                 
6  The overall experiment had 6 treatments with random allocation of participants to treatments. This paper 
reports results only from the treatment (Give, Standard). Details about the recruitment procedures, 
participation, and the design of the experiment (including screenshots) can be found at in the supplementary 
online materials which can be downloaded from the authors’ personal homepages. 
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elicited beliefs about the other group members’ contributions. Participants had to indicate a 
belief about the average contribution of the other three group members. Participants were 
rewarded for belief accuracy using the quadratic scoring rule.7
The second game (the Strategy game) served to elicit cooperation preferences. The 
Strategy game had the same parameters and payoffs as the Standard game but this time, 
contribution decisions were elicited conditionally on the average contribution of the other 
three subjects in the group (following Fischbacher et al. 2001). More specifically, participants 
received another endowment of Dkr. 50 and they knew that they were randomly re-matched to 
new groups of 4 participants. All subjects indicated an unconditional contribution and a 
conditional contribution. The latter is a complete contribution schedule for all possible levels 
of average contributions by the other 3 subjects rounded to multiples of Dkr. 5. Such a 
conditional contribution strategy consists of 11 contribution decisions, one for each average 
contribution by the other 3 subjects of Dkr. 0, 5, 10,…, or Dkr. 50. A random draw then 
selected one subject in each group to be the conditional contributor. For all other subjects the 
unconditional contribution determined payoffs while the chosen subject contributed according 
to the average of other group members’ unconditional choices and to her contribution 
strategy.
  
8
In the survey part, participants filled in a questionnaire, providing, among other items, 
information about age, gender, income and education and responded to two questions 
measuring attitudes towards trust and fairness. To ensure comparability with previous studies, 
the wording of the questions was taken from the Danish version of the World Values Survey.
 
9
Trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people?” Possible answers were coded as 1 if the answer was 
“most people can be trusted” and as 0 if the answer was “can’t be too careful”; 
 
The questions are: 
                                                 
7  Participants received an additional payment in Dkr. of 10 – 0.004 d2 ≥ 0, where d is the difference between 
the belief and the true value. 
8  This procedure was common information among the participants. One might worry that cooperation choices 
in the Standard game spill over to the measure of cooperation preferences in the Strategy game such that the 
preference measure is contaminated by actual choices. Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming) show in a 
recent paper that this concern is unwarranted. They find that the Strategy game yields the same measure 
irrespective of whether participants played the Standard game before or after the preference elicitation. 
9  http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
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Fairness: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, 
or would they try to be fair?” Possible answers range from 1: “would take advantage of you” 
to 10: “would try to be fair”.10
We recruited subjects in collaboration with Statistics Denmark (the statistics agency of 
Denmark). Statistics Denmark drew a random sample from the Danish population (aged 18-
80) and sent out letters in May 2008 by regular mail, using the official agency letterhead. The 
recipients of the letter were invited to participate in a scientific experiment organized by the 
Center of Experimental Economics (CEE) at the University of Copenhagen in which money 
could be earned. The letter explained that all recipients were randomly selected from the 
Danish population, that the earnings from the experiment will be paid out via electronic bank 
transfer, and that choices are fully anonymous between subjects and between subjects and the 
researchers from CEE. It was possible to maintain anonymity because participants logged into 
the CEE webpage using a personal identification code, the key of which was only known to 
Statistics Denmark.  
 
When participants logged into the webpage, they were provided with detailed instructions 
which were carefully designed for easy comprehension. For example, the written instructions 
were supplemented by graphical illustrations of the incentive structure (see figure A1 in the 
appendix). Before subjects made their choices, they had to answer a series of control 
questions. Throughout the experiment subjects had access to page-specific help screens and 
could at any stage go back to review the instructions. Subjects also had access to a profit 
calculator (see figure A2) to explore the relation between the payoffs and the contributions of 
all group members. In addition, participants were offered further assistance via phone or e-
mail.11
Participants did not receive feedback about other participants’ decisions until the very end 
of the experiment when they were individually paid out. Counting from the date they received 
the invitation letter, they were given one week to complete the experiment. During that week 
they could exit and re-enter the experiment as many times as they wanted. After the 
experiment closed, subjects were matched into groups and payoffs were calculated. 
Thereafter, participants could return to the website for feedback about the experimental 
  
                                                 
10  Participants also had the option to answer both questions with “don’t know / don’t want to answer”. Only 3 
percent of participants chose not to answer at least one of the questions.  
11  The median participant spent about 20 minutes to complete the Standard and the Strategy game, and it took a 
few additional minutes to fill in the questionnaire data used in this paper. 
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outcome in their respective groups and their earnings. Participants were asked to state their 
bank account number and earnings were paid out via electronic bank transfer. 
   
3.  Results 
Our subject pool is highly heterogeneous and closely matches the Danish population with 
respect to gender and regional distribution.12
Denmark is placed among the countries with the highest trust level according to the 
World Values Survey. We also find that a large share, 89.8 percent of the respondents, say 
that “most people can be trusted” and the average response to the Fairness question is 7.8 on 
a ten point scale. The two measures are distinct but positively correlated (Spearman's rank 
correlation: ρ = 0.300, p = 0.000 ).
 All age and educational groups are well 
represented, although the highly educated, the high-income earners, and middle-aged people 
are overrepresented. Slightly more than half of the 1070 participants are male (53.6 percent) 
and the age of the participants spans from 18 to 76 years, with an average of 45 and a standard 
deviation of 11 years. We asked for participants’ education on a four point scale. Participants 
with basic schooling (up to 10 years of schooling, 8 percent of the sample) are our baseline 
category in the regression analysis below. The categories comprised those with degrees from 
high school and vocational school (24 percent, variable Education 1), those with tertiary 
education up to 4 years (51 percent, Education 2), and those with a longer tertiary education 
of at least 4 years (17 percent, Education 3). Participants are sorted into three groups by 
income. Low income is set equal to 1 for participants in the bottom third, and High income is 
set to 1 for those in the top the third of the income distribution. 
13
 
  
3.1 Trust and Fairness are related to socio-economic variables 
Table 1 shows that Trust and Fairness are related to socio-economic variables like age, 
gender, education, and income. Our estimate14
                                                 
12 See Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the socio-economic characteristics of our sample and a 
comparison with the entire Danish population.  
 for Trust essentially replicates results for the 
US reported in Glaeser et al. (2000). We find that women tend to report less trust than men, 
13  This is also the case in the World Values Survey data. In wave 4 of the WVS, the Spearman rank 
correlation test between Trust and Fairness yields: ρ = 0.606; p = 0.000. 
14  We use Probit for Trust because responses are bivariate while we report OLS results for Fairness because 
answers to Fairness are coded from 1 to 10. However, Tobit estimates for Fairness provide very similar 
results. The number of observations varies for the estimations due to the fact that 3 percent of participants 
chose not to answer the trust or fairness questions. Non-respondents are dropped from the analysis.  
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and that trust increases in education. Fairness is also increasing in education, and we find an 
inverted U-shaped relation in age (this effect is similar for Trust but not significant). 
However, with respect to gender we observe interesting differences between the two survey 
measures. While women tend to express less trust (as in Glaeser et al. 2000 and Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2002), they seem to be significantly more confident that others try to be fair.  
Table 1: Determinants of Trust and Fairness 
 
 Dependent variable: 
  Trust Fairness 
Female -0.238* 0.316*** 
 (0.126) (0.108) 
Age 0.045 0.089*** 
 (0.031) (0.029) 
Age squared -0.468 -0.879*** 
 (0.347) (0.332) 
Education 1 0.201 0.467** 
 (0.192) (0.198) 
Education 2 0.615*** 0.570*** 
 (0.187) (0.186) 
Education 3 0.634*** 0.768*** 
 (0.235) (0.215) 
Low income -0.047 -0.038 
 (0.143) (0.126) 
High income 0.013 0.167 
 (0.154) (0.127) 
Constant 0.054 4.970*** 
 (0.665) (0.653) 
Prob > F (χ2) 0.001 0.000 
(Pseudo) R2 0.044 0.048 
N 1053 1061 
Probit estimate for Trust and OLS estimate for Fairness. Demographic controls include 
a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is and squared. The Education 1 
category contains those with degrees from high school or vocational education, 
Education 2 those with tertiary education up to 4 years and Education 3 those with a 
tertiary education of at least 4 years. The numbers reported are coefficients, with the 
corresponding standard errors in the parentheses; * denotes significance at 10 percent, 
** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent. 
 
3.2 Relating Trust and Fairness to behavior in the Standard game 
This section shows that beliefs are the main driver of cooperation behavior in the Standard 
game and that both Trust and Fairness are positively related to cooperation behavior. 
However, we show that Fairness is indirectly related to behavior through beliefs, while Trust 
is directly related to cooperation behavior.  
 
11 
 
Figure 1: Relation of contribution choices and beliefs in the Standard game 
 
Top panel: Histogram of the beliefs. Right panel: Histogram of the contributions. 
Center panel: Bubble plot showing the relation between beliefs and contributions. 
Bubble size corresponds to the number of observations (n = 1070). 
Figure 1 summarizes the relation between contribution choices and beliefs in the Standard 
game. The right panel of the figure shows a histogram of the contributions. Focal 
contributions like multiples of Dkr. 5 account for almost all contributions. Average 
contributions are Dkr. 35.5 (71 percent) with a standard deviation of Dkr. 14.5. The top panel 
of the figure shows a histogram of beliefs about contributions by others. The average belief 
was Dkr. 32.3 with a standard deviation of Dkr. 12.0. The bubble plot in the center panel of 
figure 1 shows that there is a clear positive relation between contributions and beliefs. This 
finding is in line with Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming) and Dufwenberg, Gächter, 
Henning-Schmidt (2008), but, in contrast to our result, they find that subjects tend to 
contribute less than they believe others to contribute. 
Table 2 provides results for the relation of Trust and Fairness to beliefs and contribution 
choices in the Standard game. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of OLS estimates, 
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explaining beliefs by trust or fairness and our demographic controls.15
Columns (1) and (2) show that beliefs are not significantly related to Trust but are strongly 
related to Fairness. Thus, people who expect others to be fair also believe that others 
generously contribute to the public good. The coefficient estimate for Fairness in (2) implies 
that subjects who express full confidence in others' fairness hold beliefs that are about Dkr. 
6.5 higher than subjects who are certain that others would take advantage of them. The 
demographic variables also explain some of the variance in beliefs. In particular, we find the 
effect of age to be strong and nonlinear. The estimates for Age and Age squared show that age 
effects are inverted U-shaped in both (1) and (2), with a maximum at the age around 47 to 50. 
Gender has a weak, and education and income have no significant influence on beliefs. While 
the effect of Fairness and some of our demographic controls is significant, it should be noted 
that all variables taken together account only for a small portion of the observed variance in 
beliefs which is in line with findings from related studies (e.g. Gächter et al. 2004).  
 Columns (3) to (6) 
show how Trust and Fairness relate to contributions. Columns (3) and (4) explain cooperation 
choices excluding beliefs, columns (5) and (6) including them. 
Columns (3) and (4) show that contributions are positively related to Trust and Fairness. 
In particular, column (3) shows that trusting participants contribute about ten percent (Dkr. 
3.2) more than non-trusting participants. The effect of Fairness on contributions is of the 
same order of magnitude as the effect on the beliefs [compare (2) and (4)]. Participants with 
full confidence in others’ fairness contribute about 20 percent (Dkr. 6.9) more than those who 
think that others will take advantage of the situation if they get a chance. The influence of our 
demographic controls on contributions mirrors the estimates for the beliefs. Gender effects are 
insignificant,16 and age has an inverted U-shaped influence on contributions  [see (3) and (4)]. 
That is, contributions rise in age until they reach a maximum at age of about 45, and fall 
thereafter.17
 
  
 
                                                 
15  Since the dependent variables Belief and Contribution are censored in [0,50] we also ran Tobit estimations 
with similar results (see Table A2 in the appendix). 
16  The experimental literature on gender effects in public goods games finds varying results (see Croson and 
Gneezy 2009 for a survey). For example, Gächter et al. (2004) find no effects, Nowell and Tinkler (1994) 
find that all-female groups are slightly more cooperative than all-male groups. Andreoni and Vesterlund 
(2001) and Solow and Kirkwood (2002) find no unambiguous gender effects. Bellemare and Kröger (2007) 
find that women exhibit significantly higher trust levels than men in their experimental trust games. 
17  Bellemare and Kröger (2007) report similar age effects for their trust games.  
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Table 2: Determinants of Beliefs and Contributions  
 
   (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dependent variable 
   Belief   Contribution 
Belief       0.938*** 0.941*** 
       (0.024) (0.024) 
Trust  0.718   3.202**  2.528**  
  (1.317)   (1.592)  (1.006)  
Fairness   0.718***   0.692**  0.016 
   (0.233)   (0.284)  (0.182) 
Female  -1.214 -1.489*  -0.542 -0.906 0.595 0.495 
  (0.824) (0.816)  (0.996) (0.996) (0.630) (0.636) 
Age  0.519** 0.582***  0.728*** 0.814*** 0.242 0.265 
  (0.224) (0.223)  (0.271) (0.273) (0.171) (0.174) 
Age squared  -5.223** -6.182**  -7.646** -8.835*** -2.749 -3.017 
  (2.521) (2.516)  (3.049) (3.073) (1.930) (1.965) 
Education 1  0.253 0.012  2.724 2.581 2.487** 2.570** 
  (1.503) (1.501)  (1.818) (1.833) (1.149) (1.169) 
Education 2  -0.904 -1.227  1.351 1.245 2.199** 2.400** 
  (1.419) (1.412)  (1.716) (1.724) (1.084) (1.100) 
Education 3  0.743 0.188  2.433 2.356 1.736 2.179* 
  (1.643) (1.635)  (1.987) (1.996) (1.256) (1.273) 
Low income  -1.422 -1.108  -1.369 -1.153 -0.036 -0.110 
  (0.962) (0.951)  (1.163) (1.161) (0.736) (0.741) 
High income  -0.661 -0.808  -0.408 -0.600 0.211 0.161 
  (0.966) (0.957)  (1.168) (1.169) (0.738) (0.746) 
Constant  21.193*** 15.678***  15.522** 11.845* -4.348 -2.910 
  (5.040) (5.065)  (6.095) (6.185) (3.884) (3.962) 
F-test  2.3 3.3  2.5 2.9 162.8 160.0 
Prob > F  0.016 0.001  0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 
R2 adjusted  0.011 0.019  0.013 0.016 0.606 0.600 
N  1053 1061  1053 1061 1053 1061 
OLS estimates for Belief and Contribution in the first experiment. Dependent variable is Belief (Model 1 and 2) or 
Contribution (remaining Models) in the first experiment. Independent variables are Belief, a dummy for Trust and the 
Fairness score. Demographic controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is and squared. The 
Education 1 category contains those with degrees from high school or vocational education, Education 2 those with tertiary 
education up to 4 years and Education 3 those with a longer tertiary education of at least 4 years. The figures reported are 
coefficients, with corresponding standard errors are given in the parentheses.; * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 
percent, *** at 1 percent. 
Columns (5) and (6) of table 2 show estimates of contribution choices when participants’ 
beliefs are included as explanatory variable. Accounting for beliefs dramatically affects 
results.  
First, it increases the share of the explained variance from about 2 percent in (3) and (4) to 
around 60 percent in (5) and (6). The coefficient for Belief is close to unity and highly 
significant. Thus, beliefs about  other participants’ contributions are a very strong predictor 
for contribution choices. This finding underscores the visual impression from figure 1 and 
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lends support to the notion of conditional cooperation discussed in more detail in the next 
section.  
Second, and more important for our purpose, is the differential effect of beliefs on the 
coefficients of Trust and Fairness in columns (5) and (6). While Fairness was insignificant in 
(4), it now has no explanatory power at all, indicating that the expected fairness of other 
people only indirectly affects behavior in the Standard game. That is, the effect of Fairness on 
contributions is belief-mediated. Accounting for beliefs in the regression has different 
consequences in the case of Trust in column (5). While the effect of Trust on beliefs was 
insignificant [see (1)], the effect on contributions is strong in (3) and survives the inclusion of 
the belief variable in (5). Thus, Trust does not seem to capture beliefs about others’ behavior 
but rather about participants’ own behavior. If we include Trust and Fairness jointly we 
observe similar results (see Table A3 in the Appendix for details). 
Third, we note that the age effects identified in (3) and (4) lose their significance once 
Belief is included as an explanatory variable in (5) and (6). The reason is that age is strongly 
related to beliefs as seen in (1) and (2) indicating that people around the age of 45 contribute 
more than others because they are more optimistic about other peoples’ contributions. The 
coefficients for gender become positive but remain insignificant. Education tends to increase 
contributions but income does not affect contributions in any systematic way. 
 
3.3 Relating Trust and Fairness to behavior in the Strategy game 
Cooperation in the Standard game is driven by preferences and beliefs. Our results from the 
Standard game suggest that the Fairness question captures beliefs while the Trust question 
captures preferences for contributing. Our Strategy game allows us to test this claim in more 
detail. The Standard game offers only limited information to identify preferences for 
contributing because we observe only one contribution decision for each participant. The 
Strategy game, in contrast, is designed to identify contribution strategies rather than single 
actions. We conclude from our analysis of the Strategy game below that the Trust question 
indeed measures preferences while the Fairness question measures beliefs.  
A strong majority of 70.2 percent of our participants are Conditional cooperators 
according to the classification developed by Fischbacher et al. (2001). These participants have 
schedules which are either monotonically or significantly increasing in the average 
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contribution of other group members.18 Participants who contribute Dkr. 0 at all levels (13.9 
percent) are called Free riders.19 The remaining 15.9 percent do not fit into either category. 
For convenience, we call them Other.20
Figure 2 shows average contribution profiles for each preference type. The horizontal axis 
shows the average contribution of the other group members and the vertical axis the 
conditional contribution.  
 
Figure 2: Cooperator types 
 
The figure shows average contribution in Dkr. conditional on average contribution by 
other group members, by cooperator type. The diagonal indicates the locus of a perfect 
match between own and others’ average contribution. 
                                                 
18  We adapt the classification of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to account for the fact that we observe fewer data 
points per participant. In Fischbacher et al. the subjects indicated their conditional contribution for 21 
contribution levels, while we have only 11 observations per subject. The original criterion of a 1-percent 
significant Spearman rank correlation is thus much more restrictive in our case. We therefore reduced the 
requested significance level to 10 percent. For the vast majority of observations the classification does not 
depend on the specific significance level. If we apply the  1-percent criterion to our data, we classify 67% as 
Conditional cooperators. Interestingly, many conditional cooperators (45.8 percent) perfectly match the 
other group members’ average. 
19  Our classification results are comparable to those found in other studies. Variation in the shares is likely to 
be due to differences by country. For example, the shares for Conditional cooperators and Free riders are in 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) 50% and 30% for Swiss subjects, in Herrmann and Thöni (2009) 56% and 6% for 
Russian subjects, in Kocher et al. (2007) 81% and 8% for US subjects, in Burlando and Guala (2003) 76% 
and 9% for  Italian subjects. 
20  Classifications often also include a third type, the Triangle contributors, who, in response to increasing 
contribution levels, increase their contribution up to some maximum and decrease it afterwards. About a 
third of the subjects we classify as Others fall into this category. 
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Tables 3 and 4 investigate how Trust and Fairness relates to cooperation preferences in 
two ways. First, we use the cooperator types as defined above and ask what determines 
whether a person is classified as Free rider or Conditional Cooperator. Second, we construct 
a measure of the “strength” of conditional cooperation and ask to what extent it can be 
accounted for by Trust and Fairness. We find that Trust is significant in both cases, while 
Fairness is not. These findings from the Strategy game support our interpretation of results 
from the Standard game that Trust captures cooperation preferences. 
Table 3: Characteristics of cooperator types 
 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Free rider Cond. Coop.  Free rider Cond. Coop. 
Trust 0.203 0.446**    
 (0.271) (0.219)    
Fairness    -0.056 -0.018 
    (0.049) (0.042) 
Female -0.191 0.138  -0.207 0.120 
 (0.177) (0.147)  (0.176) (0.146) 
Age -0.023 -0.015  -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.050) (0.041)  (0.051) (0.041) 
Age squared 0.126 0.023  -0.120 -0.044 
 (0.555) (0.452)  (0.566) (0.454) 
Education 1 0.001 -0.128  -0.034 -0.148 
 (0.357) (0.265)  (0.361) (0.266) 
Education 2 0.379 -0.312  0.440 -0.247 
 (0.335) (0.250)  (0.338) (0.251) 
Education 3 0.899** 0.063  1.021*** 0.146 
 (0.380) (0.300)  (0.383) (0.301) 
Low income -0.309 -0.139  -0.270 -0.110 
 (0.210) (0.171)  (0.208) (0.170) 
High income -0.098 -0.136  -0.134 -0.131 
 (0.203) (0.173)  (0.202) (0.171) 
Constant 0.366 1.668*  0.523 2.077** 
 (1.139) (0.925)  (1.166) (0.935) 
Model chi-square 40.8  40.5 
Prob > χ2 0.002  0.002 
N 1053  1061 
The table shows multinomial probit estimations. The dependent variable is 1 for a Free rider, 2 for a Conditional cooperator 
and 0 otherwise. Classification is according to the conditional contribution scheme in the Strategy game. Independent 
variables are a dummy for Trust and the Fairness score. Demographic controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of 
the participants, as is and squared. The Education 1 category contains those with degrees from high school or vocational 
education, Education 2 those with tertiary education up to 4 years and Education 3 those with a longer tertiary education of at 
least 4 years. The numbers reported are coefficients, with the corresponding standard errors shown in the parentheses.; * 
denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent. 
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Table 3 shows how cooperator types relate to Trust and Fairness and our socio-economic 
variables. In particular, the table shows multinomial probit estimates for the influence of Trust 
(Model 1) and Fairness (Model 2) on the probability of being a Conditional cooperator or a 
Free rider, respectively, with Other being the omitted category. We find that neither survey 
measure is a significant determinant for being a Free rider [see (1) and (3)]. Age, Income and 
Female do not predict either cooperator type in any of the 4 specifications. Interestingly, the 
significant coefficient for Education3 shows that people with long University education are 
more likely to be Free riders than people with less education.  
Columns (2) and (4) show the results for Conditional cooperators. In line with the results 
reported in table 2, we find that Trust is a significant predictor for having a preference for 
conditional cooperation in (2) while the Fairness measure is not in (4). We think it is 
remarkable that Trust is the only of our 10 variables that has any power to predict who has a 
preference for conditional cooperation in table 3.21
Table 4 presents results for the second way of investigating how Trust and Fairness relate 
to cooperation preferences. We construct a measure of the “strength” of conditional 
cooperation by calculating the average contribution over all 11 conditional contributions per 
subject and we restrict our attention to Conditional cooperators who account for 70.2 percent 
of our sample. The approach presented in table 4 also serves to address a potential objection 
to the analysis in table 3. There, we compare the types Free rider and Conditional cooperator 
against a heterogeneous class of Other types. This residual category contains a large variety of 
patterns, some including very high contributions. This heterogeneity in the refrence category 
potentially blurs the results but we find that results are robust across the two approaches in 
tables 3 and 4. 
 The marginal effect of Trust is about ten 
percentage points. 
Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions explaining the average conditional 
contribution. In support of our conjecture that Trust proxies preferences we find a highly 
significant positive influence of Trust on average conditional contribution in the Strategy 
game.22
                                                 
21  The result is robust to inclusion of both Trust and Fairness into the Model. For Free riders the variable 
Trust: β = 0.460, se = 0.302, and Fairness: β = -0.087, se = 0.053. For Conditional cooperators: Trust: β = 
0.521, se = 0.240, and Fairness: β = -0.055, se = 0.0451. 
 None of the other explanatory variables are significant, meaning that Trust is the only 
22  In column (4) of table 2, we found that those who trust contribute, given their beliefs, on average Dkr. 2.5  
more than those who do not. This finding is broadly in line with the result in Model (1) of table 4 which 
shows that Conditional cooperators who trust have average conditional cooperation schedules which are 
Dkr. 3.6 higher than those who do not trust. 
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variable among those considered here that explains the strength of conditional cooperation. 
Also in line with our conclusions from analyzing the Standard game, we find in Model (2) 
that Fairness has no systematic influence on average conditional contribution.23
Table 4: Relation of Trust and Fairness to strength of conditional cooperation 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:  
Av. conditional contribution 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
Trust 3.624***  
 (0.948)  
Fairness  0.131 
  (0.167) 
Female -0.810 -0.934 
 (0.563) (0.574) 
Age 0.084 0.095 
 (0.149) (0.152) 
Age squared -1.075 -1.181 
 (1.698) (1.728) 
Education 1 -0.920 -0.413 
 (1.000) (1.021) 
Education 2 -0.118 0.212 
 (0.942) (0.956) 
Education 3 0.141 0.587 
 (1.098) (1.117) 
Low income 0.161 0.051 
 (0.653) (0.662) 
High income -0.340 -0.216 
 (0.667) (0.680) 
Constant 20.116*** 21.775*** 
 (3.317) (3.423) 
F-test 2.2 0.5 
Prob > F 0.019 0.844 
R2  0.027 0.007 
N 741 745 
Table 4 shows OLS regressions. Dependent variable is average conditional 
contribution. Only data from subjects classified as Conditional cooperator. 
Independent variables are a dummy for Trust and the Fairness score. 
Demographic controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the 
participants, as is and squared. Education 1 groups participants with degrees 
from high school or vocational education, Education 2 those with tertiary 
education up to 4 years and Education 3 those with tertiary education of at least 
4 years. The numbers reported are coefficients, with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses.; * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** 
at 1 percent. 
 
 
  
                                                 
23  Trust remains significant and Fairness insignificant in table 4 if we include the 14 percent of Free riders.  
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4.  Summary and conclusions 
We use data from an experiment with more than 1000 participants from all walks of life in 
Denmark to show that the most prominent survey measure of trust (Trust) is an important 
predictor of social capital in the guise of voluntary contributions to public goods. We 
contribute to the microfoundations of social capital by showing that Trust proxies the 
preference-driven component of cooperation. Trust is a stronger predictor of cooperation 
preferences than gender, age, education or income. In contrast, we find that an alternative 
survey measure of social capital that has recently been introduced to the World Values 
Survey, the Fairness question, primarily explains optimistic beliefs about cooperation in 
others. These optimistic beliefs map into increased cooperation because most participants 
have preferences to cooperate given that others do, i.e. because they are conditional 
cooperators. Apart from this belief-mediated effect, we observe no direct influence of 
Fairness on cooperation.  
The effects of Trust and Fairness on cooperation are statistically significant in regressions 
which control for socio-economic variables like age, gender, income and education. The 
effects we find are not only statistically significant, they are also economically relevant. For 
example, those who trust contribute 10 percent more than those who do not, and those who 
indicate full confidence in other people’s fairness contribute 20 percent more than those who 
express minimal confidence in other’s fairness. These effects are remarkably strong, both 
compared to findings in the literature and compared to alternative explanations. First, research 
in social psychology suggests that the relation between attitudes and behavior is often rather 
weak (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 2003), and previous studies on the relation between survey and 
experimental measures of social capital find mixed effects (see introduction for a discussion 
and for references). Second, in line with much of the literature, we find that cooperation 
behavior is mainly driven by beliefs. However, if beliefs are not accounted for in regressions, 
Trust and Fairness variables account for much variation than our socio-economic variables.24
We show that Trust and Fairness are systematically related to cooperation in a one-shot 
interaction with fully anonymous counterparts, i.e. in a situation without prior information 
about or experience with their counterparts. Thus, Trust and Fairness capture aspects of 
“thin” trust towards a “generalized other” which appears to be a particularly relevant 
determinant of economic prosperity (Putnam 2001). Beliefs are likely to be particularly 
  
                                                 
24  The finding the socio-economic variables taken together can account only for only little of the total variance 
is in line with, e.g. Gächter et al. (2004) and Bellemare and Kröger (2007). 
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relevant in such anonymous one-shot interactions. After all, optimism and pessimism about 
others’ inclination to cooperate matters most when little is known about actual cooperation. 
However, in everyday life, cooperation problems often loom in groups whose members 
repeatedly interact, as in the workplace or repeat customer relations. Based on our results, we 
speculate that “thick” trust which is required in this type of repeated interaction is better 
predicted by Trust than by Fairness. The reason is that beliefs about cooperation are adjusted 
to observed contributions over time and, therefore, eventually become largely irrelevant as an 
independent determinant of behavior.25
The policy relevance of the distinction of belief-driven and preference-driven social 
capital comes from the relative stability and malleability of the two. Economists generally 
believe that overly optimistic or pessimistic beliefs are easier to shape than deep preferences, 
and policy is therefore more likely to be effective if targeting to correct overly pessimistic 
beliefs.
  
26
We now provide a simple test for our finding that Fairness captures beliefs and Trust 
captures preferences by exploiting the cross-country dimension of the World Values Survey 
data.
  
27
  
 It should be noted that our analysis below is rather preliminary and suggestive due to 
the limited number of countries for which data is available over time for both measures. The 
main reason is that the Fairness question has only been introduced in the two most recent 
waves (wave 4 and 5) and, in addition, the answer format of Fairness has changed from 
binary in wave 4 to a ten point scale in wave 5. Information about Trust and Fairness is 
available for only 20 countries in both waves.  
                                                 
25   This conjecture could be tested experimentally in a public goods game which is repeatedly played among 
the same group members. Our results suggest that Fairness has more predictive power for contributions in 
the first round than in later rounds while Trust should have a lasting impact in repeated games. 
26  This idea stands behind the “broken windows” theory which claims that (petty) crime is more common if 
signs of norm violation are highly salient. See Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg (2008) for a field experiment 
showing “cross-norm inhibition”, i.e. that violation of one norm can induce the violation of another norm.  
27  Data from Waves 4 and 5 comes from the following sources. For Wave 4 data: European and World Values 
Surveys (WVS) four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. Wave 5 data: WVS 2005 
official data file v.20081015, 2008. WVS Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
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Figure 3: Stability of Trust and Fairness over time 
 
The figure shows the relative stability of Trust and Fairness from wave 4 to wave 5 in the World Values survey 
for a sample of 33 (left panel) and 20 countries (right panel). Hollow symbols in the left panel stem for countries 
which are not present in the right panel due to missing data. 
 
Figure 3 shows how Trust (left panel) and Fairness (right panel) relate across wave 4 
(1999-2004) and wave 5 (2005-2008). Solid symbols represent the 20 countries which are 
present in both panels. The scatter plots indeed suggest that Fairness scores are more volatile 
than Trust scores. To provide a simple test, we calculate Spearman rank correlations which 
are invariant to different scaling of the two variables. We find that the correlation across 
waves is stronger for Trust (ρ = 0.705, p = 0.000) than for Fairness (ρ = 0.467, p = 0.038), 
suggesting that Trust tends to be more stable over time than Fairness. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Representativeness of sample 
 
 
Experiment 
Danish 
population* 
 
N Fraction Fraction 
Gender 
   Women 496 46.4% 50.2% 
Male 574 53.6% 49.8% 
    Age 
   18-29 år 113 10.6% 18.5% 
30-44 år 385 36.0% 29.1% 
45-59 år 482 45.1% 27.0% 
60-80 år 90 8.4% 25.3% 
    Education (highest completed) 
   Basic education (up to 10 years) 88 8.2% 26.3% 
High school or vocational education (Education 1) 254 23.7% 45.4% 
Medium tertiary education (Education 2) 544 50.8% 21.1% 
Long tertiary education (Education 3) 184 17.2% 7.1% 
    Income 
   Low Income (< Dkr. 300.000 per year) 393 36.7% 65.9% 
Middle Income (Dkr. 300.000-400.000 per year) 351 32.8% 19.1% 
High Income (> Dkr. 400.000 per year) 326 30.5% 15.0% 
    Regional distribution (size of municipality) 
 More than 500.000  104 9.7% 9.3% 
100.000 to 500.000  170 15.9% 16.4% 
50.000 to 100.000  381 35.6% 36.5% 
25.000 50.000 346 32.3% 32.3% 
Less than 25.000 69 6.4% 5.5% 
* For gender and age, the data in the column Danish population summarizes individuals between 18-80 years of 
age. For education the population is restricted to individuals between 20-69. The size of the municipality refers 
to the number of inhabitants of the municipality of residence.  
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Table A2: Determinants of beliefs and contributions 
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variable 
  Belief   Contribution 
Belief      1.513*** 1.519*** 
      (0.047) (0.048) 
Trust 0.219   4.111  2.662*  
 (1.623)   (2.659)  (1.587)  
Fairness  0.831***   1.101**  0.062 
  (0.284)   (0.478)  (0.290) 
Female -1.757* -2.053**  -1.479 -2.003 0.321 0.143 
 (1.009) (0.994)  (1.676) (1.666) (0.994) (0.998) 
Age 0.645** 0.725***  1.146** 1.281*** 0.415 0.457* 
 (0.274) (0.272)  (0.452) (0.453) (0.267) (0.269) 
Age squared -6.422** -7.647**  -12.001** -13.901*** -4.573 -5.094* 
 (3.089) (3.062)  (5.101) (5.107) (3.011) (3.040) 
Education 1 0.150 -0.161  3.512 3.219 3.295* 3.391* 
 (1.849) (1.836)  (3.055) (3.063) (1.820) (1.843) 
Education 2 -1.222 -1.645  1.384 1.100 2.650 2.811 
 (1.743) (1.725)  (2.880) (2.878) (1.709) (1.723) 
Education 3 0.778 0.063  3.353 3.222 1.954 2.540 
 (2.021) (1.999)  (3.353) (3.352) (1.995) (2.013) 
Low income -1.526 -1.140  -2.018 -1.599 0.672 0.561 
 (1.180) (1.160)  (1.958) (1.944) (1.171) (1.173) 
High income -0.837 -1.027  -0.101 -0.446 0.760 0.577 
 (1.185) (1.169)  (1.975) (1.966) (1.177) (1.182) 
Constant 20.446*** 13.467**  11.024 4.404 -22.339*** -21.387*** 
 (6.169) (6.159)  (10.167) (10.261) (6.105) (6.181) 
Sigma  14.318 14.158  22.816 22.784 12.834 12.96 
Log likelihood            -3684.5 -3718.1  -3156.6 -3193.9 -2662.2 -2702.6 
Prob > chi2  0.015 0.001  0.018 0.004 0.000 0.000 
N  1053 1061  1053 1061 1053 1061 
The table shows Tobit estimates for Belief and Contribution in the first experiment. Dependent variable is Belief (Model 1 
and 2) or Contribution (remaining Models) in the first experiment, censored at 0 and 50. Independent variables are Belief, a 
dummy for Trust and the Fairness score. Demographic controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, 
as is and squared. The Education 1 category contains those with degrees from high school or vocational education, Education 
2 those with tertiary education up to 4 years and Education 3 those with a longer tertiary education of at least 4 years. The 
figures reported are coefficients, with corresponding standard errors are given in the parentheses.; * denotes significance at 
10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent. 
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Table A3: Determinants of beliefs and contributions 
 
  OLS   Tobit 
  Belief Contribution  Belief Contribution 
Belief   0.940***    1.513*** 
   (0.024)    (0.048) 
Trust -0.748 2.233 2.936***  -1.459 2.492 3.160* 
 (1.421) (1.728) (1.097)  (1.739) (2.871) (1.714) 
Fairness 0.727*** 0.524* -0.159  0.875*** 0.897* -0.120 
 (0.250) (0.304) (0.194)  (0.305) (0.512) (0.308) 
Female -1.594* -0.839 0.659  -2.212** -1.969 0.350 
 (0.824) (1.002) (0.638)  (1.004) (1.680) (1.002) 
Age 0.523** 0.746*** 0.254  0.653** 1.168** 0.428 
 (0.225) (0.274) (0.174)  (0.274) (0.455) (0.270) 
Age squared -5.440** -7.989*** -2.877  -6.741** -12.503** -4.736 
 (2.539) (3.088) (1.966)  (3.091) (5.140) (3.042) 
Education 1 0.105 2.639 2.541**  -0.041 3.303 3.298* 
 (1.504) (1.829) (1.161)  (1.840) (3.060) (1.834) 
Education 2 -1.002 1.278 2.220**  -1.324 1.258 2.666 
 (1.419) (1.726) (1.096)  (1.734) (2.885) (1.720) 
Education 3 0.464 2.215 1.779  0.456 3.004 2.001 
 (1.644) (2.000) (1.270)  (2.012) (3.361) (2.010) 
Low income -1.299 -1.284 -0.064  -1.374 -1.850 0.654 
 (0.957) (1.164) (0.740)  (1.168) (1.952) (1.174) 
High income -0.821 -0.536 0.235  -1.052 -0.338 0.732 
 (0.962) (1.170) (0.744)  (1.175) (1.971) (1.181) 
Constant 17.386*** 12.447** -3.892  15.755** 5.912 -22.152*** 
 (5.124) (6.232) (3.979)  (6.233) (10.344) (6.204) 
Sigma    14.145 22.691 12.851 
Log likelihood    -3661.1 -3140.3 -2654.4 
Prob > F/Chi2 0.001 0.003 0.000  0.001 0.008 0.000 
N 1046 1046 1046  1046 1046 1046 
The table shows OLS and Tobit estimates for Belief and Contribution in the first experiment. Dependent variable is Belief or 
Contribution in the first experiment, censored at 0 and 50. Independent variables are Belief, a dummy for Trust and the 
Fairness score. Demographic controls include a gender dummy Female, the Age of the participants, as is and squared. The 
Education 1 category contains those with degrees from high school or vocational education, Education 2 those with tertiary 
education up to 4 years and Education 3 those with a longer tertiary education of at least 4 years. The figures reported are 
coefficients, with corresponding standard errors are given in the parentheses.; * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 
percent, *** at 1 percent. 
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Figure A1: Screenshot of graphical illustration of incentives in the Public goods game   
 
(Translation: 1: each participant is endowed with Dkr. 50, 2: All simultaneously choose a 
contribution between Dkr. 0 and 50, 3: all contributions are doubled and 4: equally shared 
among participants, 5: Each participant gets his share, 6: final earnings) 
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Figure A2: Screenshot of profit calculator  
(participants could explore payoffs for each participant by typing various contributions)  
 
 
